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MISREADING A CANONICAL WORK: AN
ANALYSIS OF MANSFIELD'S 1994 STUDY
PaulJ. Heald*
It would be hard to overestimate the influence of Edwin Mansfield's 1994
empirical study for the International Finance Corporation (an arm of the World
Bank) of American business executives' attitudes toward low levels of intellectual
property protection in developing nations.' His paper is ubiquitously cited for the
proposition that if developing countries raise their level of intellectual property
protection (especially patents), they will attract foreign investment and technology
transfer.2 In the spirit of the honoree of this symposium, I take a skeptical new
look at a canonical work and conclude that the developing world should be very
suspicious of the persistent claim that Mansfield's landmark survey of corporate
decision makers supports a maximilist implementation and enforcement strategy
across all areas of intellectual property.
Developing countries rightly question whether the costs of enforcing new
intellectual property laws will be offset by increased foreign direct investment and
technology transfer. Relying on Mansfield's research, many commentators have
been willing to assert a correlation between enforcing intellectual property rights
and increasing foreign direct investment and technology transfer to developing
countries. For example, Peter Yu cites Mansfield for the proposition that
"adopting an intellectual property regime that harmonizes with Western
notions . . . [w]ill increase foreign investment, thus creating new jobs and
facilitating technology transfer."3 Similarly, "[m]ost writers [Mansfield] who have
examined the role of intellectual property protection in developing countries have
argued that better protection generally has positive economic effects, whether
measured in terms of increased foreign direct investment or rates of moderniza-
tion and development."4 Reliance on Mansfield is predictable and persistent,'
* Allen Post Professor of Law, University of Georgia. I would like to thank Chris Thomas for
helping to organize thisfestschrift. My wonderful colleague Ray Patterson has long deserved this sort
of honor.
'See Edwin Mansfield, Inte//ectualProperty Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, andTechnology Transfer,
INT'L FIN. CORP. DISCUSSION PAPER No. 19 (1994).
2 See infra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
Peter Yu, Pirag, Prjudce, and Perspectives: An Attempt To Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-
China Intellectual Propenqy Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 63 (2001).
4 Horacio Teran, IntelleaualProperty Protection and Offshore Software Development: An Anabsis of the
U.S. Software Industry, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 1-2 (2001).
s See Robert M. Sherwood, Global Prospectsfor the Role of IntellectualProperly in Technology Transfer,
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including unquestioned citation by famous skeptics of the proposition that
42 IDEA 27, 27 (2002); Yu, supra note 3, at 63; Teran, spra note 4, at 1-2; Shanker A. Singham,
Competition Pofiq and the Stimulation of Innovation: Trips and the Interface Between Competition and Patent
Protection in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 375-76 (2000)
[Ejdwin Mansfield's work illustrates that the intellectual property protection
afforded by a country directly relates to the amount of technical development
and transfer into the developing country. This factor significantly influences the
composition of Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI"). Countries with strong
intellectual property protection tend to experience a continuing flow of new high
technology firms entering the industrial base. One World Bank study concludes
that patent protection is an important ingredient in any package to support
domestic R&D. The higher the intellectual property protection the greater
amount of investment.
Id; Thomas Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, in MARY L. RILEY, How TO PROTECT INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, IN PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 7, 8
(1997) (listing the loss of foreign investment and know-how as a cost of counterfeiting);Josh Martin,
Copyright Law Reforms Mean Better Business Climate, J. COM., 1 C (1996) (reporting on a "World Bank
survey" that demonstrates the correlation between intellectual property rights and foreign
investment); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 214 (1998) (arguing that an operational intellectual property regime will
promote foreign investment); Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Poliy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 175-76 (1994) (same); Evelyn Su, The WinnersAndthe Losers: The Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Prop ery Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 169 (2000) ("The report finds that by strengthening protection on the intellectual property rights,
there may be a positive impact on developing countries through increases in local innovation, foreign
direct investment, and technology transfers."); Clarisa Long, Patents and Cumulative Innovation, 2 WASH.
U.J.L. & POL'Y 229, 238 (2000)
Other industries, however, rely heavily on strong patent protection. One study
shows that eighty percent of firms surveyed in the chemical, transportation
equipment, electrical equipment, food, metals, and machinery industries indicated
that the strength of intellectual property protection had a "major effect" in their
willingness to invest in research and development facilities abroad.
Id; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Poitical Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 621,
638 n. 163 (1998) ("In general, strong intellectual property protection is correlated with the attraction
of foreign direct investment."); Owen Lippert, One Trip to the Dentist is Enough: Reasons to Strengthen
IntellectualProperty Rights Through the Free Trade Area of the Amencas, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 241, 248 (1998)
In the last twenty years, however, numerous studies have sought to measure the
effect of changes in IPR standards on such items as economic growth, foreign
direct investment ("FDI"), technology transfer, and consumer welfare. Special
mention must go to the pioneering work of Edwin E. Mansfield of the
University of Pennsylvania.
Id; John A. Tessensohn, Reversal of Fortune--Pharmaceutical Experimental Use and Patent Infringement in
Japan, 4J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (1998)
The importance of providing strong protection of intellectual property rights in
the ethical pharmaceutical industry can never be underestimated. The Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC)-a World Bank affiliate---discovered that
pharmaceutical companies would not be willing to invest directly in research and
development facilities if there were no patent protection available for their
2
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intellectual property enforcement levels matter much in investment decisions. 6
Although authoritatively establishing or disproving a causal link between
strong intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment is a complex
econometric exercise beyond the scope of this Article, a closer look at the famous
Mansfield paper can reduce the amount of noise in the current debate and
improve the quality of economic information usable by policymakers in
developing countries. In 1991, Mansfield surveyed at random 100 U.S. firms in
six different industries: Chemical, Transportation Equipment, Electrical
Equipment, Food, Metals, and Machinery. An astonishing 94 firms responded
to questions about whether the "strength or weakness of intellectual property
rights protection has a strong effect on whether direct investments will be made."7
The results were summarized as follows:
8
pharmaceutical products.
Id A Google search of Mansfield and "foreign direct investment" on October 9, 2002, returned
1200 hits.
6 See Keith E. Maskus, Lesronsfrom Stuying the InternationalEonomics ofIntelectualProperty Rights,
53 VAND. L RExv. 2219, 2233 (2000)
Two recent studies fred positive evidence, however. In the first, survey results
were used to develop an index of perceived weakness of IPRs in destination
countries on the part of U.S. firms. In the econometric model, the authors
[Mansfield] found that weak patents had a significantly negative impact on the
location of American FDI.
Id; Keith E. Maskus, IntelkctualPrnperty Rights and Economic Deelopment, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
471,484 (2000)
Firms with easily copied products and technologies, such as pharmaceuticals and
software, would be quite concerned about the ability of the local IPRS system to
deter imitation. Firms considering investing in a local R&D facility would pay
particular attention to local patent and trade-secrets protection. This perspective
was borne out by Mansfield (1994), who surveyed 100 U.S. firms with interna-
tional operations in 1991.
Id;J.H. Reichman, From Free-Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the Trips Agement, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 11 (1996) ("The availability of legal protection seems to affect all the
principal methods by which developing countries obtain advanced technology they are not able to
produce themselves, including foreign direct investment, joint ventures, technology transfers to
subsidiaries, and licensing or franchises.").
' Mansfield, supra note 1, at 3.
8Id
2003]
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After speculating on why the attitudes of the various industries studied varied
so widely and presenting statements from interviewees, Mansfield concluded that
"the strength or weakness of a country's system of intellectual property protection
seems to have a substantial effect, particularly in high-technology industries, on
the kinds of technology transferred by many U.S. firms to that country."'9
Although many doubt the substantiality of this link," I have found no serious
challenges to his research.
Although Mansfield's survey technique might be criticized," the real problem
is how it is interpreted by scholars and policy makers who recommend maximum
recognition of patent rights or, more broadly, strong enforcement of intellectual
property rights across the board. To begin, one must note that Mansfield did not
ask firms about the relevance of each category of intellectual property separately.
He did not question the distinct relevance of the enforcement of patents,
trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, publicity rights, or other sui generis design
rights, 2 but only asked generically about "intellectual property rights" as a group.
" Mansfield, supra note 1, at 1.
10 See, e.g., KEITH MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 128
(2000) ("[Sltrong IPRs alone do not sufficiently generate strong incentives for firms to invest in a
country."); id at 115 (noting that foreign direct investment in China increased ten-fold during a time
of virtually no effective enforcement of intellectual property rights); Carlos A. Primo Braga &
Carsten Fink, The Reationship Between IntellectualPropery Rights and Foregn Direct Investment, 9 DuKEJ.
COMP. & INT'LL. 163,164 (1998) ("Ihe available empirical evidence does not conclusively establish
the relationship between IPRs and FDI decisions."); CARLOS M. CORREA, IMPLEMENTING THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT: GENERALCONTEXTAND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COuNTRIES 28-29
(1998)
Thus Deardoff (1992) found that the poorest countries could not be expected
to gain from the strengthening of IPRs, and that they should be exempt from
any new agreement that is made to extend the patent protection under the
GATT. Similarly, Subramanian, an International Monetary Fund economist,
concluded that in welfare terms the individual country would be worse off,
because there are no dynamic benefits (such as an appreciable effect on RD) to
offset the static efficiency loses (Subramanian, 195, p. 25). A similar conclusion
was reached by Scherer and Weisburst (1995)
Id; ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
104 (1996) ('The claim that the patent system encourages foreign investment in non-IC's has not
been proved in practice.").
" It is unclear from the article whether the survey was directed to the manager within the firm
in charge of foreign direct investment decisions. In addition, when asked whether a firm would
invest in a particular country, the question was not validated with another question testing the level
of the interviewee's knowledge of the level of intellectual property protection in the country. Finally,
it appears that the interviewees were not questioned about their understanding of the term
"intellectual property," which could encompass patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets,
publicity rights, sui generis design rights, or a sub-set of this list.
12 U.S. law, for example, provides special protection beyond traditional copyright or patent law
for semi-conductors, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2000), and boat hulls, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332 (2000).
2003]
5
Heald: Misreading a Canonical Work: An Analysis of Mansfield's 1994 Stud
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2003
J. INTELL PROP. L
In order to understand why this matters, it is useful to disaggregate a theoretical
firm into two divisions that investigate levels of intellectual property protection,
one division concerned with where to locate manufacturing and research and
development facilities, and the other concerned with where to market finished
products.
Consider first the marketing division of MegaCorp. As noted earlier, owners
of patented inventions, trademarks (especially prestigious marks on consumer
goods) and copyrights (especially computer software) prefer to have exclusive
rights to market their products. The ability to suppress some forms of competi-
tion is often beneficial to a firm's bottom line. For this reason, complaints about
the costs of piracy and counterfeiting are commonplace. In fact, complaints by
U.S.,Japanese, and EU firms provided the main stimulus for the adoption of the
TRIPS Agreement." Therefore, we would expect the marketing division of
MegaCorp to be concerned about the level of protection for patented, trade-
marked, and copyrighted products it wants to sell in a developing country.
The research and manufacturing divisions of MegaCorp, however, have a
different set of concerns about the level of protection in foreign jurisdictions
where it considers investing. For example, even under the TRIPS Agreement,
protection for a trade secret is lost when it is revealed to the public. 4 In other
words, if a developing country does not adequately protect secret processes,
devices, and know-how, or provides no means to protect investments in training
local employees by enforcing restrictive covenants, then some kinds of foreign
direct investment may be deterred. If locating in a developing country means that
valuable information or technology will be appropriated or disclosed due to poor
enforcement of trade secrecy or contract law, then investment decisions may be
affected. The same logic, however, does not apply to decisions to move
manufacturing or research facilities to developing countries that fail to protect
adequately patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
By definition, patent and trademark law only protect inventions and symbols
that have been fully disclosed to the public. This is also true of the main
commercial objects of copyright protection: movies, books, compact discs, and
computer programs.'5 Moving a research and development facility to a country
without patent, trademark, or copyright law does not increase a firm's risk of
13 See Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intelkctual Property Standard-Seting, 5 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 765 (2002).
14 See TRIPS, art. 39 (1994).
" Copyright law does protect unpublished works like diaries and computer source code, but not
from mere disclosure. See 17 U.S.C. % 106 & 107 (2000). In other words, trade secret law, not
copyright law is the main vehicle for protecting valuable unpublished works from disclosure, as
opposed to copying.
[Vol. 10:309
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damaging disclosures or increase its cost of doing business. 6 In the absence of
disclosure fears, MegaCorp's research and marketing divisions should be relatively
indifferent to the level of patent, trademark, and copyright protection it finds in
a developing country. Its manufacturing decisions should instead be driven by
"transport costs and distance from markets, low wage costs in relation to labor
productivity, [access to] natural resources, and trade protection that could
encourage 'tariff jumping' investments."' 7 Similarly, a decision about where to
locate research facilities usually depends primarily on the level of education and
training of the local workforce, the condition of its financial sector," the health
of its legal system, 9 and the transparency of governmental procedures.'0
If MegaCorp's primary markets are the United States,Japan, and the European
Union, then its decision whether to locate its newest research or manufacturing
facility in Lebanon should not turn on the state of Lebanese patent law. Lebanese
patent law is irrelevant to the enforceability of MegaCorp's monopoly rights in its
important markets. 2' Even after TRIPS, patent law remains local. A patent may
be applied for in the United States (or any other WTO member) regardless of
where invention occurs.
The proper interpretation of Mansfield's findings require an understanding of
key differences between trade secrecy and patent law. Only trade secrecy law
(hand-in-hand with contract law) can protect proprietary information from
disclosure. On the other hand, the full specifications of a patented invention are
available to any pirate who can afford a computer and internet access to the
world's public patent office databases. Locating a research facility or a manufac-
turing plant in a developing country that underprotects patents, trademarks, and
copyrights should not significantly increase the likelihood that piracy will occur
there. Under this logic, the respondents to Mansfield's survey who expressed
16 In fact, to the extent that licenses need not be obtained from other intellectual property
owners, the cost of doing business may be reduced.
" Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intel/ectualProperVy Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and
Technology Transfer, 9 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'LL. 109, 123 (1998).
IS See Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Theory and Evidence,
32J. MONETARY ECON. 513 (1993) (growth in gross domestic product is strongly correlated to the
stability and health of a country's financial sector).
19 See Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8 (1999)
(correlating strength of legal system with economic growth); Ross Levine, The Legal Environment,
Banks and Long-Run Economic Growth, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 596 (1998) (same).
' See MASKUS, supra note 10, at 123; see also Reichman & Lange, infra note 32, at 96 (noting "the
Daimler Benz decision to develop software in India, where the human resources are comparably
cheap but skillful"); ENDESHAW, supra note 10, at 104 (listing non-intellectual property factors critical
to the decision to invest in a developing country).
21 Both American and European law reward foreign inventive activity without regard to the state
of the law where the invention was made. See 15 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), & (g).
2003]
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concerns over levels of "intellectual property protection" in developing countries
were most likely articulating a fear that information disclosure might occur due
to a lack of enforcement of trade secrecy law (or perhaps from a desire by their
marketing departments to suppress competitors' sales). In other words, concerns
over "intellectual property" enforcement cannot logically be read to stand for the
proposition that strong patent, trademark, or copyright laws affect foreign direct
investment (as opposed to marketing decisions).
Support for this limited reading can be found in the paper itself. Mansfield
includes many quoted comments from interviewees which indicate that disclosure
concerns are paramount. He offers the comments of a chemical executive who
explains, "[o]ur concern still resides in being able to procure a quick injunction
against a confidant who is in a position to disclose confidential information."2
A computer executive adds that "we have not implemented manufacturing
operations there that use our highest level of technology due to uncertainty over
trade secret protection."' One firm's chief patents counsels complains that there
are "no effective means to prevent a Korean employee who develops a knowledge
of the equipment, from using that information in a subsequent employment."24
Another patent counsel reveals that "[t]he technology advantage that we enjoy
over our competitors often results from catalyst compositions and... know-
how... [which] need not be transferred to licensees or subsidiaries. We typically
minimize [our] risk... by not disclosing critical catalyst or process know-how
information to the licensee. '2' These comments support the logical inference that
disclosure fears-driven by inadequate trade secret or contract law-affect
decisions to invest in manufacturing facilities or to transfer technology to the
developing world.' There is little support, on the other hand, for the proposition
that levels of patent, copyright, and trademark are relevant in foreign direct
investment decisions.
2' Mansfield, supra note 1, at 14.
23 Id at 27.
24 Id at 31.
21 Id at 30.
26 A chemical executive states that we "will not expose technology of any significant value in
countries where it is not safe." Id at 29. Other comments included expressions of concern by one
executive over the "theft of our technology" as opposed to infringement, id at 24, and by another
over the need for "assurance... that technology will remain proprietary." See Mansfield, supra note
1, at 24. One director stated that "we are reluctant to do any straight transfer of technology deals
unless the information is coded or the technology is older technology." Id at 29. A chemical
executive states that "you tend to use your older technology [where pirates] have the capital and
technical capability to duplicate your technology if they get their hands on it." Id at 30. Another
states, "[t]he technology embodied in new, but copiable products, like highly successful
agrichemicals, are withheld." Id
[Vol. 10:309
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Also significant to a proper interpretation of Mansfield's results is recognizing
the extent to which executives expressing concern over levels of intellectual
property protection were influenced by the desire to access markets for their
goods, as opposed to factors related to where to make direct investments in
facilities. Quoted comments provided by Mansfield indicate that the desire to
suppress piracy was primarily a marketing worry, as opposed to an investment
concern. A chief patent attorney recognized, "[i]nadequate or ineffective
protection of intellectual property works against introduction of the product into
such country."' 7 A chemical executive commented that the level of intellectual
property protection determines "when a weak IP country gets the product."'2
Another expressed the concern that when drugs are "introduced to the market
and the business built up to an interesting level ... a patent pirate will come into
the market with an infringing product."" Mansfield also quotes a pharmaceutical
executive concerned that "those developing countries that comprise major
pharmaceutical markets, such as Taiwan, India, and Brazil, have not made any
significant improvements."" ° It is easy to understand why rights holders care
about levels of enforcement in the countries where they market their products.
This concern may have influenced the attitudes of those surveyed on the very
different question of whether foreign direct investment decisions are influenced
by levels of intellectual property protection.
Mansfield did not restrict his survey to those executives primarily in charge of
making direct investment decisions-in fact, at least two respondents are described
as international marketing directors. Some are described as CEO's or patent
attorneys. Given the comments included in Mansfield's paper, disaggregating the
concerns of a firm's marketing division from the concerns of a firm's manufactur-
ing and R&D divisions seems to have been imperfectly accomplished, if it was
accomplished at all. This further taints Mansfield's correlation between
enforcement ofintellectual property laws and direct investment decisions. Finally,
he is often unclear what the word "investment" means when used by the firm
executives interviewed." Sometimes its seems to be used loosely to refer to the
decision to market a product as opposed to open a manufacturing plant or R&D
facility. Mansfield's paper reveals no attempt to define "direct investment" for
the respondents, and some of the overt marketing concerns expressed may be
27 d at 24.
2 Mansfield, supra note 1, at 31.
29 Id at 14. Another executive stated, "[plrior to the new Taiwan patent law, Taiwan
manufacturers copied and exported our proprietary agrichemicals." Id at 13.
'0 Id. at 13, 14.
31 Id at Appendix I.
2003]
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driven by the understanding that selling a product in a country, especially through
a wholly owned subsidiary, constitutes a sort of direct investment.
All in all, a close look at Mansfield's research provides support for the
proposition that American firms with significant disclosure worries are influenced
by the level of enforcement of trade secrecy and contract law in making foreign
direct investment decisions. Its current status as canonical evidence that
maximum enforcement of all sorts intellectual property law-and especially patent
law-will stimulate investment should not remain unchallenged. Instead of
blindly relying on Mansfield's research, a more rational strategy for developing
countries would take into account the costs and benefits of protection in the
context of their unique economic situation.32 Depending on the category of
intellectual property subject to the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries
should seriously consider minimal compliance. Under no circumstances should
a developing country accept the confident assertions made by some commenta-
tors that adopting a maximalist posture towards all protection will stimulate
foreign investment. A law-by-law analysis is always necessary.
2 SeeJ.H. Reichman & David Lange, BargainingAround the TRIPSAgreement: The CaseforOngoing
Pb/ic-Private Initiatives to Faaltate IVorSwaik Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKEJ. INT'L & CoMP.
L. 11, 50 (1998) (the "chronic problem for policymakers even in the most developed countries is that
the one-size-fits-all paradigms [are indequate] in developing countries, where different players at
different stages of development demand different and contradictory approaches").
[Vol. 10:309
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